

CONFIDENTIAL

202  
Reg. No. 3225  
R. S. No. 5 04329

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP SIX  
Task Group 78.1 \* Tarakan, Borneo, Attack Group

Action Report of  
**Tarakan, Borneo, Operation**

1-3 May 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

121639

17 09 24 MAY 1945

RECEIVED  
U.S. FLEET  
COMMANDER IN CHIEF



FILE NO. A16-3(1)/(05)

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP SIX

1s

SERIAL 0188


UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

C/O FLEET POST OFFICE  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

CONFIDENTIAL

5 May 1945

From: Commander Task Group 78.1 (Commander Amphibious Group SIX).  
To: ✓ Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.  
Via: (1) Commander Task Force 78 (Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force).  
(2) Commander Task Force 77 (Commander SEVENTH Fleet).  
Subject: Action Report, CTG 78.1 (ComPhibGrpSIX) - TARAKAN, BORNEO, Operation (1 - 3 May 1945).  
Reference: (a) Article 874(6), U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.  
(b) Com7thPhib Conf. Ltr., serial 0563 of 10 March 1945.  
Enclosure: ✓ (A) Commander Task Group 78.1 (Commander Amphibious Group SIX) Action Report on TARAKAN, BORNEO, Operation (1 - 3 May 1945).  
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded in compliance with references (a)  
and (b).

  
FORREST B. ROYAL.

X  
5 04329

2

# DISTRIBUTION

CominCh (1 advance)	(8)✓	ComAir7thFlt	(2)	MarCorps School	(1)
CinCPOA	(5)	ComSerFor7thFlt	(2)	Naval War College	(1)
CinCSWPA	(5)	ComDesPac	(2)	Army-Navy Staff College	(1)
Com3rdFlt	(2)	ComSupAirPhibsPac	(2)	Army Command & General Staff School	(1)
Com7thFlt (1 advance)	(8)	ComPhibGrp 1	(2)	JICPOA	(1)
ComGenPOA	(2)	ComPhibGrp 2	(2)	ComCruDiv 15	(2)
ComAirPac	(1)	ComPhibGrp 3	(2)	ComDesRon 21	(2)
Com5thFlt	(2)	ComPhibGrp 4	(2)	ComDesRon 22	(2)
ComPhilSeaFron	(2)	ComPhibGrp 5	(2)	ComDesDiv 28	(2)
ComSWPSeaFron	(2)	ComPhibGrp 7	(2)	ComDesDiv 42	(1)
ComPhibsPac	(2)	ComPhibGrp 8	(2)	ComLC TGrp 74	(1)
ComAdComPhibsPac	(2)	ComPhibGrp 9	(2)	ComLSTFlot 7	(5)
Com7thPhibFor	(5)	ComPhibGrp 10	(2)	ComLSTGrp 44	(1)
ComAdCom7thPhibFor	(2)	ComPhibGrp 11	(2)	ComLCSFlot 1	(2)
Com3rdPhibFor	(2)	ComPhibGrp 12	(2)	ComLSMGrp 19	(1)
ComFwdAreaGenPac	(1)	ComPhibGrp 13	(2)	ComLCIFlot 24	(5)
ComMTERons7thFlt	(1)	ComPhibTraPac	(4)	CTU 78.1.5 (COFER)	(1)
ComGen1stAustCorps	(2)	ComMTERon 9	(1)	CTU 78.1.6 (LACHLAN)	(1)
ComGen9thAustDiv	(2)	ComMTERon 36	(1)	USS ROCKY MOUNT	(2)
ComGen26thAustInfBde	(2)	ComPhibTraLant	(2)	USS RUSHMORE	(1)
AD RAAF Com	(2)	CNO (ONI)	(2)	USS TITANIA	(1)
ComGen13thAF	(2)	CNO	(2)	HMAS WESTRALIA	(1)
ComServPac	(2)	MarCorps	(1)	HMAS MANOORA	(1)

Authenticated

*J. M. Hannan*  
J. M. HANNAN,  
Flag Secretary.



CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (A) TO COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP SIX SERIAL 0188

CTG 78.1 (COMPHIBGRPSIX) ACTION REPORT

ON TARAKAN, BORNEO, OPERATION (1-3 MAY 1945)

	<u>CONTENTS</u>	<u>Page</u>
CONTENTS . . . . .		a-b
LIST OF DIRECTIVES . . . . .		c
PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE . . . . .		1-9
A. Brief Summary . . . . .		1
B. Composition of TARAKAN, BORNEO, Attack Group (TG 78.1) . . . . .		1-5
C. Planning, Rehearsal, Movement to the Objective and Pre-Assault Phase . . . . .		5-9
PART II - CHRONOLOGY . . . . .		10-25
PART III - ORDNANCE . . . . .		26-27
A. Performance of Own Ordnance . . . . .		26
B. Performance of Enemy Ordnance . . . . .		26-27
PART IV - DAMAGE . . . . .		28
A. Damage to Own Forces . . . . .		28
B. Damage to Enemy Naval Forces . . . . .		28
PART V - SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . .		29-52
A. Naval Gunfire Support . . . . .		29-32
B. Air Support . . . . .		32-35
1. Organization and Control . . . . .		32-33
2. Narrative . . . . .		33-35
C. Troops and Cargo . . . . .		35-36
1. Loading Narrative . . . . .		35-36
Appendix A - 9th Australian Division Distribution of Force to Ships by Assault Convoys.		
Appendix B - LST Unloading Table		
D. Landing Craft Control, Beach Organization, and Ship-to-Shore Movement . . . . .		37-42
E. Fighter Direction . . . . .		42-43
1. Organization . . . . .		42-43
2. Narrative . . . . .		43
F. Communications . . . . .		43-44
G. Logistics . . . . .		44-46
1. Logistics at Staging Areas . . . . .		44-46
2. Logistics at the Objective . . . . .		46
H. Medical . . . . .		47-49
1. Preparation for the Operation . . . . .		47
2. Activities En Route . . . . .		47
3. Activities at the Objective . . . . .		47-49



CONFIDENTIAL

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
PART V - (continued)	
I. Intelligence . . . . .	49-50
1. Planning . . . . .	49-50
2. Objective Area . . . . .	50
J. Comments and Recommendations . . . . .	50-52
1. Air Support . . . . .	50-51
2. Communications . . . . .	51
3. Intelligence . . . . .	51-52
PART VI - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE . . . . .	52-53
PART VII - PICTORIAL SECTION . . . . .	53

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION REPORT OF TARAKAN, BORNEO OPERATION (1 - 3 May 1945)

LIST OF DIRECTIVES

1. General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Operation Instructions No. 99.
2. CANF SWPA (Commander Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area) Operation Plan No. 9-45.
3. ComSEVENTHPhibFor (Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force) Operation Plan No. 10-45.
4. ComPhibGrpSIX (Commander Amphibious Group SIX) Attack Order No. A604-45.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

A. BRIEF SUMMARY.

1. The Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force, Vice Admiral D. E. BARBEY, was designated as the Attack Force Commander. The TARAKAN, BORNEO, Attack Group, commanded by Rear Admiral Forrest B. ROYAL, was designated as Task Group 78.1. Rear Admiral Russell S. BERKEY, Commander Task Group 74.3, Cruiser Covering Group, was second in command.
2. (a) The secondary assault echelon of the TARAKAN, BORNEO, Attack Group departed MOROTAI on 26 April 1945, commanded by Captain GRAY, to land the 7th Australian Field Regiment on SADAU ISLAND. This group was also to land and cover the Royal Australian Engineers on PETER minus ONE Day to breach the obstacles off LINGKAS beaches for the main landing.  
  
(b) The main or primary assault echelon of the TARAKAN, BORNEO, Attack Group departed MOROTAI on 27 April 1945. The 26th Australian Infantry Brigade (Reinforced) of the 9th Australian Infantry Division was transported to and landed at the objective. The Brigade landed with the 2/48 Infantry and 2/23 Infantry Battalions in assault. The 2/48 Australian Infantry Battalion comprised the first three assault waves on RED Beach. The 2/23 Australian Infantry Battalion comprised the first four assault waves on GREEN Beach. The Royal Australian Engineers were landed on RED, YELLOW and GREEN Beaches in the 5th wave at HOW Hour plus TWENTY minutes. Tanks in LCMs comprised the 6th wave on RED and GREEN ONE Beaches. The 2/24 Infantry Battalion was designated Brigade Reserve and was landed in the 7th, 8th and 9th waves on RED Beaches. All times in this report are Zone minus NINE (ITEM) time, and all dates are east longitude dates.

B. COMPOSITION OF TARAKAN, BORNEO, ATTACK GROUP (TG 78.1).

1. 78.1 TARAKAN, BORNEO, Attack Group - Rear Admiral ROYAL  
ROCKY MOUNT (Flagship) - Captain HARDESTY 1 AGC
2. 74.3 Cruiser Covering Group - Rear Admiral BERKEY  
PHOENIX (CL 46)(F), BOISE (CL 47), HOBART 3 CL  
TAYLOR (DD 468) 6 DD  
NICHOLAS (DD 449)  
O'BANNON (DD 450)  
FLETCHER (DD 445)  
JENKINS (DD 447)  
WARRAMUNGA



CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

B. COMPOSITION OF TARAKAN, BORNEO, ATTACK GROUP (TG 78.1).

-----

3. 70.1.9 MTB Support Unit - Lt. Comdr. TAPPAAN  
WACHAPREAGUE (F) 1 AGP  
MTBRons 9, 36 21 MTB
4. 78.1.1 Transport and Landing Craft Unit - Captain SINCLAIR
- 78.1.11 Transport Unit - Captain COUSIN, RANR(s)  
MANOORA, WESTRALIA 2 LSI  
TITANIA (AKA 13) 1 AKA  
RUSHMORE (ISD 14) 1 LSD
- 78.1.12 LST Unit - Captain SINCLAIR  
(LSTFlot 7 (modified) - Captain SINCLAIR)
- LST 466 (FF), 67, 171, 467, 562, 584 (GF), 21 LST  
585, 590, 613, 626, 637, 667, 697, 711,  
742, 743, 924, 993, 1025, 1027, 1035.
- (ISTs 584, 585, 590, 711, 743, 993, 1027  
carry pontoon causeways)  
(LST 67 is logistic LST)
- 78.1.13 LCI Unit - Commander JANNOTTA  
(LCIFlot 24 (modified) - Comdr. JANNOTTA)
- LCI 624 (FF), 625, 626, 634, 655, 699, 12 LCI  
700, 712, 1008 (GF), 1025, 1072, 1076.
- 78.1.14 LSM Unit - Lt. Comdr. BURGETT  
(LSM Group 19 (less 8 LSMs) - Lt. Comdr. BURGETT)
- LSM 269 (GF), 224, 267, 151 4 LSM
- 78.1.15 LCT Unit - Lieutenant DeMOSS  
(LCT Group 74)
- LCT 1317 (GF), 1310, 1312, 1314, 1316, 12 LCT  
1319, 1321, 1323, 1325, 1327, 1329, 1331.

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

B. COMPOSITION OF TARAKAN, BORNEO, ATTACK GROUP (TG 78.1).

-----

4. (continued)

\* 78.1.16 SADAU Attack Unit -  
IST 667 (tows ICT 1331) 1 IST  
LCI(L) 712 1 LCI(L)  
LSM 151 1 LSM  
LCS 8, 48 2 LCS  
PC 1122 1 PC  
PHILIP (DD 498) 1 DD  
LCI(M) 359, 362 2 LCI(M)  
LCI(L) (S&FF) 185, 961, 1000, 1071 4 LCI(L)  
(S&FF)

\* Revert to respective units on arrival in  
Transport Area PETER Day.

5. 78.1.2 Screen - Captain SMITH

78.1.21 Destroyer Unit - Captain SMITH  
WALLER (DD 466) (F) 7 DD  
BAILEY (DD 492) (FD)  
BANCROFT (DD 598) (FD)  
PHILIP (DD 498)  
DRAYTON (DD 366)  
SMITH (DD 378) (FD)  
CALDWELL (DD 605)  
  
BARCOO 3 PF  
BURDEKIN  
HAWKESBURY

78.1.22 Destroyer Escort Unit -  
FORMOE (DE 509) 2 DE  
CHARLES E. BRANNON (DE 446)

6. 78.1.3 Support Unit - Commander DAY

78.1.31 LCS Unit -  
LCS 8, 28, 43, 44, 48, 50 (F) 6 LCS  
  
78.1.32 LCI(R) Unit -  
LCI(R) 71, 72, 74, 338 4 LCI(R)  
  
78.1.33 LCI(M) Unit -  
LCI(M) 359, 362 2 LCI(M)



CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

B. COMPOSITION OF TARAKAN, BORNEO, ATTACK GROUP (TG 78.1).

-----

6. (continued)

78.1.34 Demolition Unit -  
LCI(D) 29 (F), 228

2 LCI(D)

NCDU No. 20 in LCI(D) 29

4 NCDU

NCDU No. 24 in LCI(D) 29

NCDU No. 3 in LCI(D) 228

NCDU No. 2 in LCI(D) 228

7. 78.1.4 Landing Craft Control Unit - Commander SULLIVAN

78.1.41 Control Unit RED - Lieutenant DEVANEY  
PC 1120

1 PC

\* LCI(L) 624

1 LCI(L)

\* Assigned for assault only.

78.1.42 Control Unit GREEN - Lieutenant BROWN  
SC 698, 746

2 SC

8. 78.1.5 Minesweeping Unit - Lt. Comdr. KEEFER

COFER (APD 62)(F)

1 APD

YMS 68, 51, 313, 314, 329, 334, 340,  
363, 364, 481, 73

11 YMS

78.1.51 Four YMSs

78.1.52 Four YMSs

78.1.53 Three YMSs

78.1.54 COFER (APD 62)  
Four LCVPs

9. 78.1.6 Service Unit - Commander COM, RAN

78.1.61 Survey Unit - Commander OOM, RAN  
LACHLAN (F)  
SATIN LEAF (AN 43)

1 AGS

1 AN

78.1.62 Salvage Unit -  
ATR 61  
VIREO (ATO 144)

1 ATR

1 ATO

78.1.63 Fire Fighting Unit -  
LCI(L) (S&FF) 185, 961, 1000, 1071

4 LCI(L)  
(S&FF)



CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

B. COMPOSITION OF TARAKAN, BORNEO, ATTACK GROUP (TG 78.1).

-----

10. 78.1.7 Press Unit - Lieutenant HOPKINS

ICI 635

FP 47

PCE(R) 849

1 ICI

1 FP

1 PCE(R)

11. 78.1.8 Beachmaster Unit - Lt. Comdr. MORRIS, RANR

78.1.81 Beachmaster Unit RED -

Beach Party 1 - NBC "B" - RAN

78.1.82 Beachmaster Unit YELLOW -

Beach Party 2 - NBC "B" - RAN

78.1.83 Beachmaster Unit GREEN -

Beach Party 3 - NBC "B" - RAN

78.1.84 Beach Party 10 - Lieutenant LEVIN

(In liaison with RED, YELLOW and GREEN Units)

C. PLANNING, REHEARSAL, MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AND PRE-ASSAULT PHASE.

1. On 24 March 1945, Commander Amphibious Group SIX was relieved as Commander ZAMBOANGA Attack Group and proceeded to SUBIC BAY where he reported to Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force on 26 March as Attack Group Commander for the TARAKAN, BORNEO, Operation, and conferred as to the plan of the operation. Tentative outline plans for the use of naval forces in the operation were discussed. On 25 March 1945, the Commanding General, 1st Australian Corps, requested the early presence of an advanced representative planning group of Commander Amphibious Group SIX at MOROTAI. On 27 March, CTG 78.1 Advanced Planning Section, consisting of Captain DUGAN, Chief of Staff; Commander LAMPMAN, Plans Officer; Lieutenant RADCLIFFE, Assistant Communications Officer; Lieutenant COUDURES, Assistant Intelligence Officer; and Lieutenant QUIGLEY, Assistant Commander Air Support Control Unit, departed for LEYTE and MOROTAI, arriving at MOROTAI on 28 March. Lieutenant RADCLIFFE and Lieutenant COUDURES remained at LEYTE to attend conferences. On 29 March, Commander Amphibious Group SIX departed SUBIC BAY and proceeded to LEYTE with the remainder of his staff, where a conference was held with Commander Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area on 31 March 1945 at SEVENTH Fleet Headquarters.
2. On 31 March, one member of CTG 78.1 Planning Staff returned from MOROTAI with copies of GHQ SWPA Staff Studies dealing with the next

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

C. PLANNING, REHEARSAL, MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AND PRE-ASSAULT PHASE.

-----

2. (continued)

two objectives to be taken by amphibious assaults. On 3 April, Captain HAYES of Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force Staff came aboard to confer on pending operations.

3. Close liaison was being maintained, meanwhile, with the Advanced Planning Staff at MOROTAI. Some of the decisions reached were to tow LCTs and LCMs to the objective, that the nature of the beaches would demand the use of three additional pontoon causeways (total seven), and that the LCVPs in assault should tow collapsible boats to ensure some of the troops landing dry. It was decided, if the obstacles on the beach could not be destroyed by air bombardment, they would have to be destroyed by landing the Royal Australian Engineers on PETER minus ONE Day to breach them. In order to ensure artillery support and smoke screen for the breaching operation, it was decided to make a landing on SADAU ISLAND on PETER minus ONE Day with one company of infantry and to emplace an artillery battery.
4. Commander Amphibious Group SIX departed LEYTE on 4 April, arriving MOROTAI on 6 April 1945. Members of the Advanced Planning Staff returned aboard the Flagship and discussions were held over the results of the planning up to this time.
5. On 7 April 1945, conferences were held ashore and aboard ship with Commanding General, 1st Australian Corps, and Staff. The general plan of the operation was presented. In the staff discussions that followed many important points were discussed and many were agreed upon. The detailed plans of the respective commanders were approved with but one exception - PETER Day was proposed to be postponed two days to 1 May 1945. This postponement was later approved by GHQ, SWPA. This decision came about as a result of studies on beach profiles and conditions, times of sunrise and high tide.
6. Conferences continued with the 26th Brigade of the 9th Australian Division, 1st Australian Corps. Final stages of the planning were completed on 15 April 1945. A rehearsal exercise involving the Royal Australian Engineer demolition units was held off SABATAI-TOEA village, MOROTAI, on 19 April 1945. The Royal Australian Air Force participated in the rehearsal by laying a protective smoke screen. The exercise was repeated that same morning because of faulty timing.
7. A control line and beach party communication rehearsal was held 22 April 1945, using the ships that would form the Line of Departure for the actual assault.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

C. PLANNING, REHEARSAL, MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AND PRE-ASSAULT PHASE.  
-----

8. A rehearsal exercise of the assault landing to be conducted on PETER minus ONE Day was held on 19 April using KOKOJA ISLAND, MOROTAI STRAITS, as the objective. Certain features of KOKOJA ISLAND resembled those of SADAU ISLAND.
9. On 24 April 1945, a rehearsal was held in MOROTAI STRAITS of the actual assault. The area to the right of the Navy docks was used as a beach-head in order to simulate landing conditions as near as possible to those expected at the objective. Many defects were disclosed in this exercise. A re-run of the entire exercise was held immediately after the first rehearsal, with much improvement noted. A conference was held in the afternoon aboard the Attack Group Flagship with all control personnel, wave guide officers, Support Craft Officers, and other personnel concerned present. The errors made in the first rehearsal that morning were pointed out to those concerned.
10. These rehearsals proved to be very worthwhile in view of what took place at the objective:
  - (a) The SADAU ISLAND Attack Unit took its objective on PETER minus ONE Day. The Royal Australian Engineers later that same day breached the obstacles on the main beaches successfully, and marked them, making possible the main landing as planned for the next day.
  - (b) On PETER Day the assault waves were landed on the correct beaches through the breaches in times varying from twenty seconds to two minutes late, despite a current much greater than had been anticipated and the difficult terrain. There was a current of three knots at ebb and flood tides. The only beach the LVTs could negotiate was GREEN, and that with difficulty.
11. The Cruiser Covering Force and Fire Support Group left SUBIC BAY on 24 April in accordance with the Movement Plan. The Minesweeping and Hydrographic Group left LEYTE on 22 April, joined at ZAMBOANGA with other units coming from MALABANG, MINDANAO, and arrived at the objective on 27 April, and commenced minesweeping and hydrographic survey. Minesweeping was difficult, because of the many types of mines encountered and water conditions. The approach of the main force through preferred Track BAKER, south of MENOELOEN ISLAND, had to be abandoned because of the possibility that mines there had not yet been swept. This necessitated approaching through Track ABLE which afforded deeper water, but was much less in width. A red conical top buoy and a black top buoy of Japanese origin were found by the Hydrographic Group and left remaining, the latter buoy being in mid-channel. A buoy was planted at Point WHIRLAWAY, buoy 2 south of Point EQUINOX, and buoy 3 was planted marking the break-off point for Tracks ABLE and BAKER. Buoys 1 and 4 were also



CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

C. PLANNING, REHEARSAL, MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AND PRE-ASSAULT PHASE.  
-----

11. (continued)

planted, as ordered, in positions as previously charted. The hydrographic Group on the afternoon of PETER minus ONE Day installed fixed white lights on the mid-channel buoy (Point WHIRLAWAY) and numbers 2 and 4 buoys to aid the approach of the Attack Group. The harbor entrance range was lighted. Beach reconnaissance and marking of gaps through obstacles for assault waves and slots for LSTs were completed 30 April, without casualties, despite mortar and machine gun fire from the beach. These Groups retired each night prior to PETER Day while at the objective.

12. On 27 April, ten motor torpedo boats arrived at TAWITAWI and commenced operations on the east coast of northern BORNEO on 28 April.
13. The SADAU Assault Echelon departed MOROTAI STRAITS 26 April. The main assault force departed 27 April. Both echelons involved in the two separate assaults arrived in their respective areas off the designated beaches on time, the main assault force arriving one hour ahead of time to allow for the transit to the Anchorage Area of the last ships of the strung out Approach Formation through narrow Track ABLE. The landings proceeded exactly as had been planned.
14. Preliminary naval bombardment was conducted by the Cruiser Covering Group on PETER Day with only the destroyers participating. This Group had also covered the Minesweeping Group in their activities from 27 April to 1 May. The Minesweeping Group on 27 April first made exploratory sweeps from the hundred fathom curve to Point WHIRLAWAY with negative results. They then next obtained negative results in sweeps of Areas FORK, SPOON and KNIFE to Point BAKER. One thousand yards north and south of the sides of Area KNIFE, west of Point BAKER, four magnetic mines were swept. The LCVF sweeps, the same day, explored SPATULA and swept two chemical horned type mines southwest of MENOELOEN ISLAND, apparently newly laid. The Covering Force could not safely proceed west of Point BAKER, and did not. On 28 April, three magnetic mines in Area KNIFE, and seven enemy horned mines were swept in Area SPATULA, southwest of MENOELOEN ISLAND. Two magnetic mines were still known to be in SPATULA and not yet swept. One of these magnetic mines self detonated near a YMS in Area KNIFE, west of Point BAKER, approach Track BAKER, after two days of sweeping, was still not considered safe for the passage of the Cruiser Covering Force.
15. On 29 April, magnetic sweeps were negative in Areas KNIFE and SPATULA. A floating mine was sunk by gunfire four miles east of the number 2 buoy. Nine additional enemy contact mines were swept southwest of MENOELOEN. A one-thousand yard check sweep made on both sides of Approach Track BAKER was also negative. Area PLATE was swept within 1200 yards of the beaches

CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

C. PLANNING, REHEARSAL, MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AND PRE-ASSAULT PHASE.

-----

15. (continued)

and the LCVPs made two sweeps within 400 yards of the pier, all negative. By this time, five magnetic mines in Area KNIFE were still unaccounted for, as well as two west of the southern tip of TARAKAN. Sweepers on 30 April were to continue their magnetic and acoustic sweeps in KNIFE, SPATULA and PLATE and leave by the north channel (Track ABLE) alone. The cruisers could not yet safely venture into Area KNIFE.

16. On 30 April, two influence mines were swept west of the south tip of TARAKAN, and two additional enemy mines southwest of MENOELOEN ISLAND were swept after the landing and fire support parties had passed through Route BAKER. Later, one of the fire support destroyers, USS JENKINS, on retiring, struck a mine 1,000 yards off the center of Track Baker. The sweepers swept two more mines in Approach Track BAKER immediately after this incident. Five "influence" mines were reported "removed" at an unknown location. Because Track BAKER was now not considered safe, the sweepers concentrated on Track ABLE which was still found negative. That night the Attack Group safely transited Track ABLE, as had been recommended, and began the assault on PETER Day, 1 May 1945.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

(All times are Minus NINE (ITEM) Zone)  
(All dates are east longitude date)

30 April 1945 - PETER minus One Day

Scattered to broken cirrus with scattered to broken cumulus. Distant lightning in evening. Wind gentle westerly becoming southeasterly in evening. Sea smooth. Visibility unrestricted.

Cruiser Covering Group and Minesweeping Unit of TG 78.1 were already present at the objective conducting operations.

- 0001 - CTG 78.1 underway in U.S.S. ROCKY MOUNT with main assault echelon.
- 0001 - DRAYTON left station for one hour to investigate a sound contact. Results were negative.
- 0322 - BAILEY depth charged a doubtful contact.
- 0738 - Fleet course and axis changed to 277° T.
- 0800 - Landing of Australian Artillery (TU 78.1.16) on SADAU ISLAND near TARAKAN commenced on schedule without opposition.
- 0957 - SADAU ISLAND landing completed without opposition.
- 1100 - 25 pounders emplaced and firing cover for Royal Australian Engineers Demolition teams and NCDUs, who were breaching obstacles for the main assault.
- 1340 - Fleet course and axis changed to 273° T.
- 1400 - Two enemy float planes reported to have bombed SADAU ISLAND without effect. (This was not confirmed).
- 1500 - WINOOSKI and ROBINSON arrived TAWITAWI and reported for duty.
- 1527 - CTG 74.3 reported JENKINS hit a mine in minesweeping area SPATULA at the objective. The destroyer suffered extensive damages, but casualties were light.
- 1600 - Commander LCT Group 74 in LCT 1317 and LCTs 1310, 1312, 1314, 1316, 1319, and 1321 cast off tow lines and proceeded at 6 knots accompanied by HMAS BARCOO.
- 1705 - Convoy changed from Cruising Formation 1-CS to Approach Formation 1-RS.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

-----

30 April 1945 - PETER minus One Day (Continued)

- 1730 - Two mines were reported swept in the vicinity where the JENKINS was mined on Approach Track BAKER.
- 1800 - Convoy passed through area of floating debris of stumps and logs - Investigated with no consequence.
- 1800 - CTU 78.1.16 informed CTG 78.1 that all beach obstacles for the assault landings had been breached.
- 1900 - WACHAPREAGUE and MTB Squadron 36 (less 6 MTBs) departed TAWITAWI for objective area.
- 1959 - JENKINS (at TARAkan) dead in water and leaking.
- 2010 - WALLER reported torpedo noise and went to investigate.
- 2014 - WALLER attacked good sound contact.
- 2014 - Formation made two 30° turns to the left.
- 2034 - WALLER reported oil on the water and made another depth charge attack.
- 2042 - Formation came back to base course of 273° T. with two 30° turns to the right.
- 2045 - WALLER lost contact.
- 2055 - FORMOE designated by Screen Commander to stay in the vicinity of the contact.
- 2055 - Speed of formation slowed to six knots.
- 2121 - Radar contact made with Cruiser Covering Group.
- 2230 - Division One closed to interval 275 yards and Division Two to 150 yards, for entry on Approach Track ABLE, instead of Track BAKER as previously was planned.

1 May 1945 - PETER Day

Broken to overcast high clouds. Crossed under a band of cumulus overcast in early morning. Encountered moderate showers under the band of cumulus. Otherwise scattered cumulus throughout period. Lightning

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

-----

1 May 1945 - PETER Day (Continued)

visible in the tops of the cumulus before and after crossing under. Scattered showers in the area most of period. Wind gentle to moderate southwesterly, shifting to gentle southeasterly in afternoon. Sea smooth. Visibility unrestricted except in showers, and locally over targets by smoke.

- 0140 - BURDEKIN, BAILEY, and BRANNON proceeded to screening stations.
- 0222 - LST 67, FS 404, and FS 274 left formation for Area KING. LCI(L) 712 and LSM 151 left formation for anchorage area KING.
- 0222 - Formation passed through Point WHIRLAWAY one hour ahead of schedule.
- 0229 - Changed course to 267° T.
- 0254 - Changed course to 280° T.
- 0305 - Changed course to 220° T.
- 0335 - Changed course to 270° T.
- 0400 - Changed course to 255° T.
- 0442 - Changed course to 265° T.
- 0452 - Changed course to 260° T.
- 0503 - Changed course to 267° T.
- 0507 - Changed course to 293° T.
- 0520 - At Point EUREKA executed "DEPLOY". Attack Group was still one hour ahead of schedule. This allowed rear ships of columns to arrive in Transport Areas on schedule.
- 0520 - WALLER proceeded to assigned screen station. NICHOLAS and TAYLOR proceeded to Fire Support Sector DOG.
- 0529 - ROCKY MOUNT anchored in berth 4 of Transport Area MIKE.
- 0630 - Report received that a torpedo passed under the bow of LST 562. Torpedo came from direction of CAPE PASIR.
- 0639 - DDs opened fire on mouth of river as probable position of torpedo launching site.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

-----

1 May 1945 - PETER Day (Continued)

- 0639 - LST 562 reported small submarine surfaced astern then submerged immediately.
- 0641 - BARCOO was ordered to investigate this last report.
- 0646 - LST 637 launched first LVT.
- 0651 - TITANIA had launched all boats.
- 0651 - RUSHMORE launched LCMs.
- 0654 - MANOORA's boats in the water.
- 0654 - RUSHMORE reported a torpedo glanced off her port beam without damage. It came from the direction of CAPE PASIR. (Not confirmed).
- 0655 - Dawn CAP reported on station.
- 0655 - LST 467 launched LVTs.
- 0659 - All LVTs launched.
- 0700 - Time check made.
- 0700 - All assault causeway LSTs and the RUSHMORE on station in LST Area TWO. The MANOORA, WESTRALIA, and TITANIA were all on station in Transport Area MIKE.
- 0702 - LST 1027 launched first causeway.
- 0705 - CTU 78.1.12 reported all LVTs launched.
- 0707 - Support Line formed up.
- 0712 - RUSHMORE reported all boats launched.
- 0712 - Boat waves from MANOORA observed proceeding to Line of Departure.
- 0714 - LCMs from RUSHMORE observed forming up well behind LST Area so as to remain out of the way.
- 0720 - CTU 78.1.4 reported he believed he could meet HOW Hour.
- 0722 - SC 746 reported on station on Line of Departure.

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

-----

1 May 1945 - PETER Day (Continued)

0724 - All GREEN waves formed.

0725 - LST 637 stood out beyond LST Area TWO to clear the area.

0726 - LSTs 584 and 585 launched causeways. The causeways from LSTs 590, 711, 743, 993, and 1027 had also been launched.

0727 - CTU 78.1.4 reported HOW Hour could be met.

0730 - HOW Hour confirmed as 0815.

0730 - SC 698 moved into position on Line of Departure.

0730 - Time check.

0731 - Line of Departure formed.

0733 - RED waves 1, 2, and 3 formed and moving to Line of Departure.

0736 - LCS support group ordered into position ahead of Line of Departure.

0738 - CTG 78.1 ordered CTU 78.1.5 to resweep Area SPATULA in order that Track BAKER may be made safe. Area PLATTER also was to be swept for mines.

0739 - B-24s observed coming over for air strikes on the beach area.

0739 - Engineer Demolition Party dispatched from LST 667.

0741 - Four P-38s now on station.

0742 - All waves for RED Beach formed.

0747 - CTU 78.1.3 reported all ships of the support unit ready and on station.

0750 - Air strikes on beach area commenced a little late.

0756 - First wave dispatched to RED and GREEN Beaches.

0756 - LCI(M)s opened mortar fire.

0756 - Four B-24s came over for air strike on the beach area.

0800 - LCS(L)s opened fire with 40mm and 3 inch.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

-----

1 May 1945 - PETER Day (Continued)

- 0801 - Second wave dispatched to RED and GREEN Beaches.
- 0802 - Six B-24s coming over for air strike on the beach area.
- 0803 - Bombs landed right on the target.
- 0806 - Third wave dispatched to RED and GREEN Beaches.
- 0809 - Red flares sent up by support craft, to direct naval gunfire to shift inland.
- 0809 - Air Observer dropped white star clusters - First waves were 500 yards from beach.
- 0811 - Wave Four was dispatched to GREEN Beaches.
- 0815 - First wave landed on GREEN Beaches.
- 0816.5 - First wave landed on RED Beach TWO.
- 0818 - Second wave landed on GREEN Beaches.
- 0819 - Reserve Battalion from WESTRALIA observed moving up to Line of Departure.
- 0820 - Second wave landed on RED Beach.
- 0822 - CTG 78.1 directed Reserves to be held at Line of Departure.
- 0824 - LST 590 moved up to Line of Departure.
- 0825 - Third wave landed on GREEN Beaches.
- 0826 - Third wave landed on RED TWO Beach.
- 0826 - Wave Five dispatched to RED, YELLOW and GREEN Beaches.
- 0826 - Fourth wave landed on GREEN Beaches. (No Fourth wave on RED TWO Beach)
- 0829 - LST 697 and 711 moved up to Line of Departure with causeways.
- 0831 - Wave Six dispatched RED and GREEN ONE Beaches.
- 0831 - LST 993 moved up to Line of Departure.

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

-----

1 May 1945 - PETER Day (Continued)

- 0833 - TU 78.1.3 ceased immediate gunfire support scheduled fires.
- 0836 - Troops reported covering positions were taken without opposition. Bridge was intact and landings were made practically dry.
- 0837 - TAYLOR reported camouflaged boat was off beach on port beam.
- 0839 - Fifth wave landed on RED, YELLOW and GREEN Beaches.
- 0844 - Beach Party 10 landed and was in liaison with RED, YELLOW and GREEN Beach Party units.
- 0844 - Sixth wave landed on GREEN ONE Beach.
- 0845 - Wave Six landed on RED TWO Beach.
- 0845 - RED Beachmaster Unit reported RED TWO to be obstructed, with large logs and a defensive wall on beach.
- 0847 - Haze, smoke and dust obscured the beach area.
- 0848 - Possible mine drifted to the starboard of TAYLOR - investigation negative.
- 0848 - Air Force requested permission to make another air strike.
- 0850 - Australian Principal Beachmaster Advanced Command Post indicated the condition of LST slots on YELLOW Beach. Extensive bull-dozing was required on some slots.
- 0850 - Australian Principal Beachmaster Advanced Command Post indicated RED Beach was not ready for LSTs.
- 0850 - All causeway LSTs observed on Line of Departure.
- 0906 - CTG 78.1 ordered CTU 78.1.4 to "Land the Reserves".
- 0907 - LST 584 was ordered to beach.
- 0915 - Seventh wave containing Reserves sent into GREEN Beaches.
- 0915 - RUSHMORE reported that her LCMs were completely unloaded.
- 0918 - LST 584 beached on RED Beach slot 1 with causeway beached dry.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

-----

1 May 1945 - PETER Day (Continued)

- 0920 - Eighth wave dispatched to GREEN Beach.
- 0921 - Bogie reported 195°, 19 miles.
- 0921 - LST 585 with causeways beached on RED Beach Slot 2.
- 0923 - LST 590 ordered to beach.
- 0925 - Ninth and last wave dispatched to GREEN Beach.
- 0927 - BOISE reported bogie bearing 265°, 14 miles, course 325° T.  
B-25 strike on barracks commenced.
- 0927 - Seventh wave landed.
- 0930 - LST 171 ordered to beach.
- 0930 - CIC reported bogie now at 250°, 16 miles.
- 0931 - LST 743 with causeways beached on YELLOW Beach Slot 5.
- 0932 - Eighth wave landed.
- 0936 - LST 590 with causeways beached on RED Beach Slot 3.
- 0937 - CTG 78.1 ordered general unloading.
- 0939 - Ninth wave landed.
- 0941 - LST 711 with causeways beached on YELLOW Beach Slot 4.
- 0955 - LST 993 with causeways beached on YELLOW Beach Slot 6.
- 1001 - LST 1027 beached on YELLOW Beach Slot 7.
- 1001 - The line-up of LSTs was as follows:

Slot 1 RED Beach	LST 584
Slot 2 RED Beach	LST 585
Slot 3 RED Beach	LST 590
Slot 4 YELLOW Beach	LST 711
Slot 5 YELLOW Beach	LST 743
Slot 6 YELLOW Beach	LST 993
Slot 7 YELLOW Beach	LST 1027

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

-----

1 May 1945 - PETER Day (Continued)

- 1020 - CTU 78.1.4 directed LCIs to proceed to north pier and unload two at a time.
- 1022 - Enemy mortar fire landed in water off GREEN TWO Beach.
- 1024 - LCIs 625 and 1025 were observed alongside LST 590 on the beach.
- 1025 - Artillery fire observed 400 yards to the right and 700 yards off GREEN TWO Beach.
- 1030 - LST 584 and 590 started unloading.
- 1034 - LCI Fire Support Craft observed heading back from the beach to form picket line.
- 1034 - Brigadier WHITEHEAD and staff went ashore.
- 1035 - SC 698 directed general cargo from TITANIA, and WESTRALIA to be sent to GREEN TWO.
- 1042 - Single plane sprayed DDT (insecticide) along the beaches.
- 1042 - MANOORA ordered to direct small craft with cargo to GREEN TWO for unloading.
- 1104 - LCI 634 and LCI 1076 were observed alongside LST 584 on RED Beach.
- 1106 - Captain DUGAN, Chief of Staff, and party left ROCKY MOUNT for an inspection of beaches.
- 1125 - A huge explosion was observed to the right of GREEN Beach.
- 1135 - LCIs 700 and 1008 beached on YELLOW Beach.
- 1142 - Mortar fire observed falling on beachhead area.
- 1143 - LCI 1076 unloaded and retracted from beach.
- 1145 - LST 742 ordered to beach on the starboard side of LST 584.
- 1150 - Nine LCI(L)s have unloaded. LCI 699 was awaiting instructions.
- 1154 - LST 171 beached 650 feet off beach aft of LSTs 584 and 585 on RED Beach.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

-----

1 May 1945 - PETER Day (Continued)

- 1157 - LCS 44 was fired on by mortar one mile south of GREEN Beach TWO.
- 1204 - Commander 26th Brigade, 9th Australian Division, assumed command ashore of his troops.
- 1216 - LST 171 retracted from RED Beach still unable to beach in a cleared area.
- 1230 - Line of Departure was dissolved.
- 1308 - O'BANNON relieved of fire support and ordered to stand by JENKINS.
- 1315 - WACHAPREAGUE and MTB Ron stood in and reported to CTG 78.1 for duty.
- 1325 - Principal Beachmaster indicated that it was now impossible to unload more LCMs and LCTs.
- 1339 - Docks were useable by hand labor only. Dutch crane on long pier was unserviceable.
- 1349 - Unloading of LCVPs and LCMs stopped due to rapid falling of tide and consequent stranding of boats.
- 1349 - Unloading by hand from boat piers continued.
- 1356 - Unloading of LCTs bogged down by mud.
- 1401 - Unloading at piers limited to landing of bulk stores. Damage hindered unloading at southern pier.
- 1404 - For the night an anti-submarine screen was established on an arc of three mile radius from Point JOHN covering anchorage Area LOVE.
- 1437 - Northern Pier was found to be intact - tide was still hindering unloading.
- 1454 - CTG 78.1 directed no night retirement from the objective area because of slowness in unloading and so that good advantage might be taken of high tide. Enemy opposition had been negative so far.
- 1500 - COFER and YMSs reported to CTU 78.1.2 in WALLER for duty as screen for the night.
- 1524 - CTG 78.1 ordered all ships to maintain sufficient armed sentries for protection against hostile small craft and swimmers.

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

-----

1 May 1945 - PETER Day (Continued)

- 1538 - Captain DUGAN and party returned to ROCKY MOUNT after inspecting beach-head and conferring with Landing Craft Control Officer, Beach Group Commander and the Commander, 26th Infantry Brigade.
- 1539 - SC 746 reported that there was a possible "Q" boat unmanned in bush north of CAPE KRIS.
- 1557 - Rear Admiral BERKEY came aboard ROCKY MOUNT.
- 1600 - TU 74.3.5, WARRAMUNGA and HOBART, released by CTG 78.1, departed TARAkan for HOLLANDIA.
- 1601 - Unloading area was limited by anti-tank ditch on beach.
- 1610 - ATR 61 ordered to tow JENKINS alongside PHOENIX and remain to assist.
- 1617 - ROCKY MOUNT moved to berth 64 in Anchorage Area LOVE.
- 1715 - ROCKY MOUNT anchored in berth 64 in Anchorage Area LOVE.
- 1715 - Rear Admiral BERKEY left the ROCKY MOUNT.
- 1736 - Two LCSs were stationed off SADAU to prevent movement of enemy craft into anchorage area during the night.
- 1745 - Combat Air Patrol was relieved by dusk patrol of 2 P-61s.
- 1942 - CTG 78.1 advised all ships that general unloading would continue during the night and that recognition of our own small craft was mandatory.
- 2008 - All beached LSTs turned on lights and illuminated the beach and docks.
- 2044 - LST 697 ordered to proceed into beach at Causeway 1.
- 2045 - LST 924 ordered to proceed into beach at Causeway 6.
- 2047 - All ships and craft ordered to use full running lights in Transport Area.
- 2052 - LST 613 ordered to proceed into beach at Causeway 4.
- 2100 - LST 171 ordered to proceed into beach at Causeway 2.
- 2120 - LST 626 ordered to proceed into beach at Causeway 4.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

-----

1 May 1945 - PETER Day (Continued).

2130 - LST 171 beached.

2137 - LST 613 beached. LSTs 626, 697, 924, were also beached by 2200.

2 May 1945 - PETER plus One Day

Broken high clouds decreasing to scattered by sunrise, with scattered cumulus. Shower visible in distance in late afternoon. Wind gentle westerly first part of period, gentle southeasterly second half. Sea smooth. Visibility unrestricted.

0048 - Beach was reported under mortar fire.

0155 - MANOORA reported she was completely unloaded.

0653 - CTG 78.1 ordered VIREO to report to LST 584 to assist in retracting any of the LSTs from the beach.

0710 - CTG 78.1 ordered LST 1025 and LST 1035 to assist other LSTs in retracting beach.

0740 - P-61s dawn patrol relieved by CAP of four F-4-Us.

0746 - CTG 78.1 ordered ATR 61, unless required by JENKINS, to report to CTU 78.1.4 to aid in retraction of LSTs.

0800 - B-25s commenced a call air strike 1000 yards in front of own front lines.

0900 - MANILA Courier plane tied up astern of ROCKY MOUNT.

0906 - CTG 78.1 ordered LCS 8 to destroy two small boats east of CAPE PASIR.

0916 - CTG 78.1 designated LST 67 as water ship for all small craft.

0916 - PTs with B-25 cover commenced operating to the north of TARAKAN ISLAND.

0927 - Courier plane took off for MANILA.

1000 - MOROTAI Courier plane landed in Anchorage Area LOVE.

1028 - Major General WOOTTEN, General Officer Commanding, 9th Australian Division, came aboard from MOROTAI Courier plane.

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

-----

2 May 1945 - PETER plus One Day

- 1045 - ROBINSON stood in.
- 1050 - VIREO was ordered to relieve ATR 61 and reported to CTG 74.3 to tow JENKINS to LEYTE. ATR 61 was to return to Transport Area to assist LSTs.
- 1050 - CALDWELL entered Anchorage Area LOVE.
- 1100 - Major General WOOTTEN went ashore to the Brigade Headquarters.
- 1125 - Air strike by three B-25s observed northwest of beach area.
- 1127 - WINOOSKI arrived and anchored in berth 134, Area LOVE.
- 1130 - Rear Admiral BERKEY came aboard.
- 1200 - MANOORA, WESTRALIA, and RUSHMORE screened by BANCROFT and O'BANNON departed for MOROTAI to reload and to return.
- 1200 - Enemy shells landed near WACHAPREAGUE. PTs shifted berths to avoid the gunfire.
- 1220 - CTU 78.1.13 reported that all LCIs were unloaded.
- 1258 - Only one LCT was reported unloaded - four LCTs were waiting for LSTs on the beach to retract.
- 1310 - Rear Admiral BERKEY left Flagship with Rear Admiral ROYAL. They went ashore to confer with Brigadier WHITEHEAD and inspect the beachhead.
- 1322 - CTG 78.1 directed six LCIs for screening duty to report to CTU 78.1.3 prior 1700.
- 1530 - Camouflaged batteries at CAPE DJOEATA sank YMS 481 and damaged YMSs 334 and 364. COFER plus LCSs 8 and 28, silenced the battery. LCS 44, LCI 1008 and LCVPs rescued survivors close in shore under direct enemy fire. YMSs 51 and 340 were not hit.
- 1530 - Rear Admiral ROYAL and Major General WOOTTEN returned to the Flagship.
- 1543 - Four B-25s strafed and bombed the CAPE DJOEATA area. After they finished, the FLETCHER bombarded the same area.
- 1555 - Commander LST Group 44 shifted Flag to LST 924.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

-----

2 May 1945 - PETER plus One Day (Continued)

- 1600 - Major General WOOTTEN departed for MOROTAI in the Courier plane with Captain HAINS, Assistant Chief of Staff to Admiral ROYAL.
- 1620 - LST 67 anchored and began functions as logistics ship.
- 1630 - Four P-38s also made low bombing and strafing runs on gun emplacements on CAPE DJOEATA, in the vicinity of the YMS damage.
- 1635 - YMSs 340 and 364 returned to ROCKY MOUNT with casualties.
- 1646 - Lieutenant C. K. SOPER, Commanding Officer of YMS 364 came aboard and reported to Chief of Staff regarding damage to YMSs.
- 1740 - LCS 44 sighted a mine 3° 23.8' N, 117° 30' E.
- 1755 - Daylight CAP relieved by two P-61s.
- 1811 - FLETCHER took aboard wounded from YMS engagement off the LCS 44.
- 1900 - CTG 78.1 directed LCI 1000 to report to CTU 78.1.6 for refueling.
- 1900 - FLETCHER requested advice as to disposition of wounded survivors.
- 1902 - FLETCHER was ordered to come alongside ROCKY MOUNT to transfer casualties.
- 2015 - CTG 78.1 directed all LSTs to illuminate all causeways and beaches but at Flash RED to darken ship until alert is over.
- 2248 - CTU 78.1.16 directed CTU 78.1.3 to destroy mine sighted by LCS 44.
- 2305 - Commander LCT Group 74 reported LCT 1314 was unloaded and LCTs 1312, 1316, and 1331 were reloaded from MANOORA, TITANIA and RUSHMORE and were awaiting discharge.

3 May 1945 - PETER plus Two Day

Broken high clouds decreasing to scattered by noon. Scattered cumulus during day. Distant lightning in evening. Wind gentle northwesterly becoming moderate southeasterly by mid-afternoon. Sea smooth. Visibility unrestricted.

- 0751 - ATR 61 stood in to assist LSTs retracting from the beach.
- 0755 - PHILIP stood in to Anchorage Area.

CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

-----

3 May 1945 - PETER plus Two Day (Continued)

- 0830 - PHOENIX proceeded to vicinity of SADAU ISLAND to fire on enemy coastal batteries and installations on CAPE DJOEATA.
- 0850 - PHOENIX opened fire on CAPE DJOEATA.
- 0920 - LST 697 retracted from the beach.
- 0925 - LST 711 retracted.
- 0928 - LST 626 retracted.
- 0929 - PT boats made runs parallel to the beach to create waves to assist in retracting the LSTs.
- 0931 - LST 171 retracted.
- 0940 - LST 613 retracted.
- 1000 - CTU 78.1.2 assumed control of naval gunfire support.
- 1010 - LST 924 retracted.
- 1015 - LSTs 584, 585, 590, 711, 743, 993, and 1027 remained on the beach.
- 1025 - Rear Admiral BERKEY came aboard the ROCKY MOUNT.
- 1033 - PHOENIX returned from SADAU ISLAND.
- 1103 - Captain MURPHY and Admiral BERKEY left the ROCKY MOUNT.
- 1145 - CTG 78.1 directed O'BANNON to report to CTG 74.3.
- 1300 - PHOENIX and BOISE screened by NICHOLAS, TAYLOR, and O'BANNON departed for SUBIC BAY.
- 1529 - CAP was relieved by four P-38s.
- 1554 - Captain GRAY in FORMOE (DE 509), assumed control of all naval matters as Representative, SEVENTH Amphibious Force at TARAKAN, BORNEO.
- 1651 - CTU 78.1.16 assumed air warning guard.
- 1700 - Air Support control passed to RAAF section ashore.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

-----

3 May 1945 - PETER plus Two Day (Continued)

1700 - CTG 78.1 in ROCKY MOUNT escorted by CALDWELL, departed TARAKAN for MOROTAI.

1830 - TU 78.1.92 with Commander LST Group 44 in LST 924 with LSTs 171, 613, 626, and 697 screened by PHILIP, SC 746, YMS 51, and YMS 363 departed TARAKAN. Seven LSTs still were fast in the mud on the beach, but were unloaded. The remaining eight other LSTs had commenced to unload from the stream.

CONFIDENTIAL

PART III

ORDNANCE

A. PERFORMANCE OF OWN ORDNANCE.

1. Will be covered in individual ship's action reports.

B. PERFORMANCE OF ENEMY ORDNANCE.

1. The sea area was heavily mined by both enemy and Allied mines, and, as a result, extensive sweeping was required. Minesweeping commenced on PETER minus FOUR. Up to the departure of this command on PETER plus TWO Day a total of 45 mines had been accounted for (including the one the JENKINS struck). These were encountered as follows:

- P-4 Four magnetic mines (Allied), Area KNIFE, main approach channel southeast of TARAKAN.  
Two chemical-horned moored mines (Japanese), Area SPATULA, southwest of MENOELOEN ISLAND.
- P-3 Three magnetic mines (Allied), Area KNIFE, southeast of TARAKAN.  
Seven chemical-horned moored mines (Japanese), Area SPATULA.
- P-2 One magnetic mine (Allied), Area KNIFE.  
Nine moored contact mines (Japanese), Area SPATULA.
- P-1 Two magnetic mines (Allied), Area PLATE, west of south tip of TARAKAN.  
Two mines, type unknown (origin unknown), Area SPATULA, on approach Track BAKER.  
Two mines, type unknown (Japanese), Area SPATULA, southwest of MENOELOEN ISLAND.  
One mine, struck by JENKINS, Area SPATULA, in approach Track BAKER, southwest of MENOELOEN ISLAND.  
Five "influence" mines reported "removed" at unknown location.
- P/1 Five moored mines, type unknown (Japanese), Area SAUCER, north of TARAKAN ISLAND.  
Two magnetic mines (Allied), Area SAUCER.

Great difficulties were experienced in sweeping due to the strong currents which prevailed, and against which minesweepers towing gear made little headway. Mines would sometimes become fouled in a sweeper's gear and be towed from an unswept area into an area previously believed clear. Experience also proved that several passes were necessary for magnetic mines to ensure that one "click" was activated. In addition, it is believed that where acoustic mines were buried beneath three or four feet of silt they might be insulated by it, but that the current



CONFIDENTIAL

PART III

ORDNANCE

B. PERFORMANCE OF ENEMY ORDNANCE.  
-----

1. (continued)

might later carry away the silt, rendering the mine active. None of the acoustic mines in the TARAKAN Area were reported swept up to PETER plus TWO Day. A report on enemy mines recovered will be made by the Mine Disposal Officer from the Staff of Commander SEVENTH Fleet who remained in the area for this purpose.

2. A battery of coastal guns (reported to be three 3" and several smaller caliber) opened fire on four YMSs sweeping north of TARAKAN on PETER plus ONE Day from the vicinity of CAPE DJOEATA. This battery caused extensive damage to our minesweepers. (See PART IV).
3. The only opposition to the actual landings consisted of small arms fire and mortar fire. After the troops landed their advance to the airfield was held up by enemy land mines.
4. There was an elaborate system of steel and concrete pillboxes banked with earth covering the actual beaches. These were not manned after the initial bombardment started. Some guns of minor calibre were intact and available for recovery by those charged with this duty.

CONFIDENTIAL

PART IV

DAMAGE

A. DAMAGE TO OWN FORCES.

- 28 April - YMS 329 suffered machinery derangement when mine exploded thirty yards astern which will necessitate drydocking and overhaul.
- 30 April - JENKINS (DD 447) struck mine in Area SPATULA. Extensive hull damage under forward fireroom, boilers salted.
- 2 May - YMS 481 exploded, sunk by direct hits from enemy camouflaged coastal batteries off CAPE DJOEATA. YMS 334 was also hit by machine gun and AA battery fire suffering extensive superstructure damage. YMS 364 straddled by shells with numerous small holes in hull and superstructure from shrapnel and small arms fire.

B. DAMAGE TO ENEMY NAVAL FORCES.

- 28 April - PTs sunk one lugger, set one small cargo vessel on fire, and damaged four others north of TARAkan at DARVEL and TAWAO.
- 1 May - PTs north of TARAkan captured 11 Japanese on rafts and left five barges burning furiously.
- 2 May - PTs sunk 70-ton SD in river mouth north of NOENOEKAN Town.



SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSA. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT.

1. The bombardment scheduled on PETER minus FOUR, THREE and TWO Days was delivered on a greatly reduced scale as mine fields extended out past the range of the 5" batteries. Careful sweeping was required on PETER minus FOUR and THREE Days before the fire support ships could come within range of the principal targets. From dawn until noon on PETER minus THREE and TWO Days rain and smoke from burning oil fires obscured the target making it impossible to deliver accurate fire. CTG 74.3 ordered a 50% increase in ammunition allowance for the PETER minus ONE Day bombardment.
2. On PETER minus ONE Day there were three operations:
  - (a) Landing of artillery on SADAU ISLAND. Forces assigned to support were 1 DD and 2 LCS(L)s. DD fired a few rounds only, LCS(L)s each fired a rocket salvo and some 3" fire.
  - (b) First Engineers' Demolition Landing. Support ships assigned to support were 1 CL, 4 DDs, 2 LCS(L)s, 2 LCI(M)s. Fire was delivered approximately as scheduled.
  - (c) Second Engineers' Demolition Landing. Support ships assigned were 1 CL, 3 DDs, 2 LCS(L)s, 2 LCI(M)s. In view of the lack of enemy opposition and due to the very short time period between these two engineers' landings, only the close support craft fired.
3. On PETER Day, in support of the assault, the following ships were assigned: 2 CLs, 6 DDs, 2 LCI(M)s, 4 LCS(L)s, 4 LCI(R)s.
4. Based on information now available, the following amounts were fired in scheduled fire:

692 rounds 6"  
3510 rounds 5"  
642 rounds 3"  
1159 rounds 4.2" mortar  
2844 rounds 4.5" rockets
5. After HOW Hour on PETER Day and until control of Naval Gunfire Support was turned over to CTU 78.1.2 at 1000 on PETER plus TWO Day, one DD was maintained in support of each of the three infantry battalions. Also during this time CTG 74.3 made one spotting plane continuously available to the naval gunfire controller on call over the area and guarding the naval gunfire common. This proved to be of great assistance.

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT.

-----

6. The following missions were fired:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Type of Firing</u>	<u>Target (Grid posit)</u>
1 May	0649	FLETCHER	Direct Fire	435621 - Suspected torpedo launchers
1 May	0915	TAYLOR	Direct Fire	Barge 385660
1 May	1008	LCSs 44,48	Direct Fire	467592 Luggers and small ammo dump
1 May	1137	NICHOLAS	Supporting 2/23 Bn	430635
1 May	1236	TAYLOR	Supporting 2/48 Bn	426653 AA Guns
1 May	1423	NICHOLAS	Supporting 2/23 Bn	436628 mortars and machine guns
1 May	1635	NICHOLAS	Supporting 2/23 Bn	435632
2 May	0813	NICHOLAS	Supporting 2/24 Bn	417665
2 May	0837	SMITH	Supporting 2/24 Bn	409671
2 May	1015	FLETCHER	Deep Support Air Spot	405685
2 May	1120	SMITH	Supporting 2/24 Bn	403678
2 May	1143	FLETCHER	Deep Support Air Spot	403678
2 May	1340	TAYLOR	Supporting 2/23 Bn	436646
2 May	1415	TAYLOR	Supporting 2/23 Bn	442644



CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT.

-----

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Type of Firing</u>	<u>Target (Grid posit)</u>
2 May	1523	TAYLOR	Supporting 2/23 Bn	446649
2 May	1545	COPER	Direct Fire	Guns at DJOEATA
2 May	1600	LCS(L) 8,28	Direct fire	Guns at DJOEATA
2 May	1645	FLETCHER	Direct Fire, air spot (PHOENIX plane)	Guns at DJOEATA
2 May	1805	FLETCHER	Direct Fire, air spot (PHOENIX plane)	Guns at DJOEATA
3 May	0940	PHOENIX	Direct Fire, air spot (PHOENIX plane)	Guns at DJOEATA

7. Performance of Shore Fire Control Parties.

- (a) This command found the Australian Shore Fire Control Parties thoroughly competent. Their communications and radio procedure were good as was their handling of fire support missions. But particularly outstanding was their morning and evening situation report from all parties describing the operations in their respective sectors. The Naval Gunfire Controller and monitoring stations had no difficulty in keeping abreast of the tactical situation.

8. Bombardment Liaison Officers.

- (a) The Australian BLO teams assigned to the fire support destroyers were a valuable aid to the naval gunfire controller. Using the BLO radios, destroyers were able to transmit and receive on the naval gunfire common and their assigned firing frequency. This is the first operation in the experience of this command that all fire support destroyers have had adequate gunfire communications.

9. Maps.

(a) Comment

- (1) The 1/25,000 map using the Army 6 figure grid system proved slow and cumbersome to use due to the guess work involved

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT.

-----

9. (a) (1) (continued)

in determining the third and sixth figure and the searching of the margin for the correct first and second, fourth and fifth numerals. Furthermore, the grid systems of various scale maps did not agree.

(b) Recommendation.

- (1) That the M square superimposed grid system be used universally by all units. That all scale maps provided be accurately printed with the same grid system.

10. Air Spot.

(a) Comment.

- (1) To facilitate the availability of air spot, CTG 74.3 ordered a rotation of planes to remain airborne throughout the day and maintain a watch on the gunfire common. This proved a most satisfactory arrangement for routine fire missions. The spotting plane, already oriented to the general area, was able to quickly change to a designated firing net and commence spotting. During the priority mission at CAPE DJOEATA at least 30 minutes of daylight firing was gained by having a plane on station.

(b) Recommendation.

- (1) That during an operation of approximately this size (one or two brigades) one plane be continuously on station and maintain a watch on the gunfire common frequency.
- (2) That for larger operations with a greater number of plane-carrying ships, more extensive arrangements be made for continuously available air spot.

B. AIR SUPPORT.

1. Organization and Control.

- (a) Air Support for the TARAKAN Operation was provided by the Royal Australian Air Force Command, augmented by units of the Thirteenth Air Force, USAAF, and of the First Tactical Air Force, RAAF. This support included fighter protection for convoys, air cover at the objective area, air cover for motor torpedo boat operations, pre-PETER Day strikes, direct support of the landing, courier and photographic service, and air-sea rescue operations. Participation of naval aircraft, in air support was limited to anti-sub-



SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSB. AIR SUPPORT.  
-----

## 1. (a) (continued).

marine patrols provided by ComAir, SEVENTH Fleet and to standby air-sea rescue service by cruiser aircraft of the Close Covering Group.

- (b) Acting through an Army Support Air Controller embarked in the U.S.S. ROCKY MOUNT, control of all air activity at the objective area beginning on PETER Day was assumed by CTG 78.1 and remained with him until 1700 PETER plus TWO Day, at which time control was transferred ashore to the RAAF Air Support Section. In his direction of direct air support during this period the Army Controller was assisted by representatives of the RAAF Air Support Section and by the officer and enlisted personnel of CASCU Com-PhibGroupSIX. Commencing on PETER Day and continuing through the period of CTG 78.1 control, an Air Observer from the 9th Australian Division was present over the objective area from 0730 to 1730 daily. A resume of fighter direction activities appears in a separate section of this report.

2. Narrative.(a) Pre-PETER Day Air Operations.

- (1) Beginning on PETER minus EIGHTEEN Day and extending through PETER minus SIX Day, a series of bombing strikes was conducted by the Thirteenth Air Force, USAAF, and First Tactical Air Force, RAAF, against northwestern and southern Borneo. Primary targets were enemy airfields, aircraft, staging areas, and shipping, and other enemy activities constituting a potential threat to the TARAKAN Landing.
- (2) From PETER minus FIVE Day to PETER minus TWO Day, units of these air forces struck pre-designated targets in and around the objective area.
- (3) On PETER minus ONE Day, air strikes were carried out in support of the engineering operations on Yellow Beach. Smoke was laid to screen the removal of beach obstacles by Australian engineers on TARAKAN.

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

B. AIR SUPPORT.

-----

2. (b) PETER Day Direct Support.

- (1) Between 0715 and 0800 on the morning of PETER Day, three special strike groups reported on station. One group of B-24s bombed the landing beach area. A second group of B-24s struck enemy installations and positions within the primary and secondary target areas indicated on the Air Force Target Map. A third group of P-38s loaded with 1000 lb. bombs was unable to carry out its special strike mission on the beach area before 0800, and there being no other target immediately available, the group returned to base with full ammunition and bomb load.
- (2) During PETER-Day, seven direct support groups totalling 39 aircraft were over the objective area in readiness to conduct close support missions in aid of assaulting ground units. Three called strikes only were conducted, involving the use of 10 aircraft, the targets being enemy artillery emplacements, pillboxes and trucks. One section of 2 B-25s sprayed DDT (insecticide spray) over a wide part of the LINGKAS Area.

(c) PETER Plus ONE and TWO Day.

- (1) Air activity during PETER plus ONE and TWO Day was limited to the rendering of called support missions in aid of advancing troops. During PETER plus TWO Day, a total of five missions was carried out, involving the employment of 16 B-25s. Specific targets damaged and/or destroyed were a coastal gun emplacement, a supply and storage area, and several mortar and machine gun positions.
- (2) Close support showed a marked increase on PETER plus TWO Day, when a total of nine direct support missions were carried out at the instance of Air Support Parties. Nineteen aircraft (B-25s) were employed in either bombing or strafing. Targets struck included enemy gun positions, machine gun nests, and other strong points. CTG 78.1 retained control until 1700 when the ROCKY MOUNT departed, and Air Support was transferred to the RAAF Air Support Section ashore.
- (3) During the period of CTG 78.1 control of direct air support a total of 88 sorties were made (not including those of the Air Observer); 12½ tons of bombs (500 lb. and 250 lb. GP) and 144 para-frag clusters were dropped; and a total of 17 direct support missions were conducted, one of these originating with the Army Support Air Controller, the remainder having resulted from requests of Army units ashore.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

✓  
B. AIR SUPPORT.  
-----

2. (c) (4) CTG 78.1 also exercised general control of aircraft (B-25s) employed as cooperative air cover for Motor Torpedo Boat Operations. Immediate direction of these aircraft rested with the MTBs, whose action report should properly cover their activities.

C. TROOPS AND CARGO.

1. Loading Narrative.

(a) Preliminary.

- (1) All loading of troops and cargo of TG 78.1 was conducted at MOROTAI. Shipping for the PETER minus ONE Day operations, consisted of 1 LST, 1 LSM, 1 LCI, and 1 LCT. Assault shipping for the main landing on PETER Day consisted of 2 LSIs, 1 AKA, 1 LSD, 19 LSTs, 10 LCIs, 3 LSMs and 7 LCTs. Planning for the loading was accomplished with the 9th Australian Division at MOROTAI.

(b) Loading.

- (1) Loading commenced on 20 April 1945 and was completed at 1700 on 25 April 1945, except some minor items. Troops were loaded aboard the LSIs and the LCIs on 23 April 1945.
- (2) LSTs were loaded at BLUE Beach on the eastern shore of GILA PENINSULA, MOROTAI. The TITANIA (AKA 13) was loaded at the U.S. Army Docks and loading of the two LSIs (MANOORA and WESTRALIA in that order) was effected at the Navy Dock. LSMs, LCTs, and LCMs loaded at the LCM jetty to the north of RED Beach. The U.S. Army Docks were used for the loading of LCIs and the RUSHMORE (LSD 14) loaded in her anchorage.
- (3) Seven LSTs carried pontoon causeways for the operation in order to overcome the difficulties presented by the muddy shallow beaches at TARAKAN. These causeways were beached and placed in use just after high tide on PETER Day.
- (4) The TITANIA was short about 300 tons of Marsden matting for the construction of air strips. There were two reasons for this. First, the S.S. LAKE ORMOC necessarily sailed from MOROTAI before being completely unloaded, and second, approximately ten percent of the matting in the LAKE ORMOC was damaged during handling.

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

C. TROOPS AND CARGO.

-----

1. (b) (5) The unloading difficulties at the beach delayed the supply of lighterage craft to the LSIs and the AKA. The MANOCRA reported completely unloaded at 0155 and the WESTRALIA reported the same at 1026 on PETER plus ONE. The RUSHMORE had completed during the morning of PETER Day and all three ships were sailed at noon of PETER plus ONE.

APPENDICES:

- A. 9th Australian Division Distribution of Force to Ships by Assault Convoys.
- B. LST Unloading Table.



## APPENDIX A

NOTES - # Includes 51 LTT 4 not shown as vehicles in estimated capacities - (a) Balance discharged main beach P Day  
(b) Available for use on main beach P Day

CONFIDENTIAL

LST UNLOADING TABLE

DAY	PETER DAY	PETER plus ONE Day	PETER plus TWO Day
TIME	1800	0600	1800
	1800	0600	1800
LST	Cargo	Cargo	Cargo
585	80	100	
584	50	100	
590	95	100	
711	81	100	
743	70	96	100
993	35	99	100
1027	40	92	100
697			68 100
171			45 100
613			60 100
626			100
924			15 100

466 )  
467 )  
562 )  
637 )  
667 )  
1025 )  
1035 )  
742 )

Commenced unloading in the stream.

Each had completed a very small percentage at 1000

PETER plus TWO Day.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

D. LANDING CRAFT CONTROL, BEACH ORGANIZATION, AND SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT.

1. Landing Craft Control.

- (a) The Landing Craft Control Officer (CTU 78.1.4) in PC 1120 organized and operated in accordance with Standard Operating Procedure for LCCOs, ComSEVENTHPhib Serial 2822 of 12 November 1944. Assisting control officers CTU 78.1.41 and CTU 78.1.42 were assigned to RED and GREEN Beaches respectively.
- (b) Vessels assigned were PC 1120 primary and RED Beach control, SC 698 - control GREEN Beaches ONE and TWO, LCI(L) 624 - left flank guide ship RED Beach, SC 746 - right flank guide ship GREEN Beach TWO.
- (c) The Line of Departure was established at 0700 on PETER Day. SC 698, SC 746 and LCI(L) 624 were secured from Line of Departure at 1200.
- (d) Details of operations in the assault and past assault phases are set forth in Paragraph 3 Ship to Shore Movement hereto.
- (e) Landing Craft Control Officer (CTU 78.1.4) secured from PC 1120 at 1200 PETER plus TWO Day and reported on board ROCKY MOUNT (AGC3).

2. Beach Organization.

- (a) Three beach parties were supplied by RAN Commando "B", commanded by a Principal Beachmaster (CTU 78.1.8). The following beach party assignments were made:

Beach Party #1	RED Beach TWO
Beach Party #2	GREEN Beaches ONE and TWO
Beach Party #3	YELLOW Beach

Elements of Beach Party #10, U.S. Navy, were assigned for liaison with the RAN Commando "B" parties. RAN Beach Commando "B" was a sub-unit of the Second Australian Beach Group which corresponds to a U. S. Army Shore Party. One Boat Company of the 593 E.B.&S. Regiment, U. S. Army, and one company of the 727th Amphibian Tractor Battalion were attached to the 26th Infantry Brigade.

3. Ship to Shore Movement.

- (a) The assault troops were boated and LVTs were launched in very good time. Light winds, calm sea and unlimited visibility prevailed. The first three waves for RED and GREEN Beaches were well on their way to positions seaward of the Line of Departure by 0715. The Line of Departure was formed by 0700. Some difficulty was experienced in anchoring the control ships due to a three knot current and a soft bottom. SC 698 (GREEN Control Ship)

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSD. LANDING CRAFT CONTROL, BEACH ORGANIZATION, AND SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT.  
-----

## 3. (a) (Continued)

dragged its anchor twice. Recovery with a hand winch was necessarily slow and much time was consumed. However, good holding ground was finally obtained and the Line of Departure was re-established at 0731. The close fire support group took position 100 yards forward of the Line of Departure at 0730, according to schedule.

- (b) Waves ONE to SIX, RED and GREEN Beaches were in their positions at 100 yard intervals behind the Line of Departure by 0745. The first and succeeding waves were dispatched from the Line of Departure exactly on scheduled timing. The first wave (LVTs) landed on GREEN Beaches ONE and TWO within twenty seconds of HOW Hour. The boated waves landed on RED Beach at HOW plus 1.5 minutes. This wave had transferred from LCVPs to light folding assault boats which had been towed in by each LCV. The transfer was made in good style but the smaller craft took time to negotiate the narrow gaps which had been cut through a triple line of obstacles near the beach. The small assault craft grounded out well in to the beach where the troops got ashore without great difficulty. These small collapsible craft served their purpose in this operation. The LCVPs would have grounded further out on a soft mud bank. This bank might have been crossed but only with greatest difficulty and certain loss or damage to much equipment. The success of the small assault boats should not be taken as an indication of their general utility. When planning to use them in future operations, definite limitations should be considered. The speed of advance under tow had to be reduced to  $4\frac{1}{2}$  knots to overcome the yawing and swamping which was experienced during rehearsal runs when they were towed at higher speeds. The rehearsals were run in a calm sea and it is felt that the results would have been worse with even a moderate sea.
- (c) Subsequent assault waves landed at regularly scheduled intervals. Waves 5 and 6 landed their heavy equipment and guns under most difficult circumstances. Marsden matting, fabric backed and corduroy reinforced, was carried in each LCM and a road was laid from ramps to shore. An effective anti-tank barrier built of oil line pipe and scrap metal covered with the heavy clay soil had to be breached for practically all exits from the waterline and a deep wide ditch behind it had to be bridged. The lateral road behind the beach had considerable soft gummy clay which in some spots had to be covered with mat before traffic could pass. Iron plates were also used on the softer spots. It was fortunate that a supply of plates was on hand nearby the oil company's storage area.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

D. LANDING CRAFT CONTROL, BEACH ORGANIZATION, AND SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT.

-----

3. (Continued)

- (d) Meanwhile the reserve troops which had been boated in three waves were held on call. They were ordered in at 0906 and were dispatched from the Line of Departure beginning 0915 in organized waves with a five-minute interval between waves.
- (e) LSTs were required to beach as soon as practicable after landing the assault in order to take advantage of the very necessary high tide which was rapidly receding. Seven LSTs were to tow in pontoon causeways and launch them by the momentum method. The gaps which had been cut through the obstacles in front of each beaching station were only wide enough to admit the pontoons. The plan called for LSTs to break through the obstacles just to the left of each gap and release the pontoons at the right moment when going through. The pontoons would have been stopped had they been engaged by the obstacles. Very fine ship handling and timing was necessary. Two LCMs were assigned to follow in behind each LST to assist the pontoons through if required. Although the results of the engineering operations on PETER minus ONE Day confirmed the practicability of the LST Beaching Plan, it was thought that only one LST should be sent in at first and subsequent beachings could be patterned on that experience. When the Principal Beachmaster reported the beach ready LST 584 was ordered in and proceeded at 0907 I (high water was about 0830). The beaching was entirely successful. The ship crashed through the obstacles and pontoons went through the gaps to the beach. The results of this experience and instructions as to course and speed were broadcasted to all LSTs. The second LST proceeded in at 0921 and by 1001 all seven pontoon-carrying LSTs were successfully beached. However, one of these skidded in so far on the mud bank that the causeway could not be brought to its ramp. As the bank dried out a mat roadway was constructed and the ship was unloaded over it.
- (f) The LST Beaching Plan also called for two LSTs to dry beach (without causeways) on GREEN Beach TWO. It was found that the area between the rows of obstacles at that point was blocked off by logs and large tree trunks which effectively blocked the LSTs. Several attempts were made to beach the two LSTs on GREEN Beach TWO starting at 0930. Here again the obstacles, dolphins, and a log boom prevented beaching.
- (g) The LCIs carried service troops assigned to beach labor. It was necessary to get these in as quickly as possible. The LCIs could not negotiate the obstacles at any place. Therefore six LCIs were

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

D. LANDING CRAFT CONTROL, BEACH ORGANIZATION, AND SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT.

-----

3. (g) (Continued)

unloaded alongside of beached LSTs. The troops went up over the LSTs on cargo nets and boarding ladders and then proceeded ashore over the pontoon causeways. Six additional LCIs were unloaded at the outer end of the northern LINGKAS pier.

- (h) By this time the rapidly falling tide prevented further beaching operations of large craft and the mud stopped beaching of small craft. When small craft got in at all, it was impossible to unload their cargo and vehicles and get the boats off before they dried out. By low tide the waterline line had receded out beyond the sterns of the seven LSTs, on the beach.
- (i) Small craft were unloaded at both piers. This was limited to general cargo which was raised from the boats by hand. The northern pier at LINGKAS was too frail to support cranes. Gaps in the big southern pier prevented moving cranes out there.
- (j) Many attempts were made to get LCTs ashore and unloaded but only one of these was successful. However, that LCT soon dried out and was not available for a turn-around load.
- (k) An enemy flat barge was taken off GREEN Beach and pressed into service for unloading the transports. This barge, two LCTs (one of which was partially loaded) and one LSM were all the large units available to start unloading transports. The initial loads of all other LCTs and LSMs could not be taken off due to landing conditions described above. The two LCTs were assigned to unload the spar deck of the RUSHMORE (LSD 14) leaving the two transports with the LSM, the Jap barge and small craft. HMAS MANOORA was unloaded by 0155 and HMAS WESTRALIA by 1026 on PETER plus ONE Day. MANOORA, WESTRALIA and RUSHMORE were sailed on PETER plus ONE at noon.
- (l) The second tide on PETER Day was  $2\frac{1}{2}$  feet less than the morning tide and occurred at approximately 2100. At this time five LSTs were successfully beached alongside LSTs then at causeways. The seven LSTs beached in the morning had been unloaded but the water did not rise high enough to free the causeways from the mud so as to move them from one LST ramp to the second ramp. The switch was accomplished the next morning at high tide.
- (m) At this time an attempt was made to retract the seven unloaded LSTs but they were fast on the mud, and could not be budged despite all devices employed.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

D. LANDING CRAFT CONTROL, BEACH ORGANIZATION, AND SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT.

-----

3. (Continued)

- (n) At 1130 on PETER plus ONE Day CTG 78.1 called a conference on board ROCKY MOUNT (AGC 3) of all unit commanders concerned, to plan the retraction of the LSTs on the high tide of PETER plus TWO morning. This tide was 11 inches less than on PETER Day and succeeding tides were progressively lower until spring tide levels would return on PETER plus TEN Day. The following operations were planned at the conference:
- (1) Concentrate all efforts at first on the five LSTs beached on PETER night. These were not as far on as the others and at high water would have 12 to 15 inches more water at their sterns than the others.
  - (2) At high water, PETER plus ONE evening, send in all ships possible to take fuel and water from the 5 LSTs.
  - (3) Further reduction of fluids if required by pumping over side.
  - (4) 0700 PETER plus TWO Day send in two LCIs to go alongside each of these five LSTs, one of these bow in and the other bow out, to assist in towing and to provide flushing action from their screws.
  - (5) Four of the LCIs in item (4) were fire fighting equipped and were to use their fire nozzles to flush alongside the bows of the LSTs.
  - (6) Five LSTs and ATR 61 were to come in to take up the towing.
  - (7) Two LCMs were assigned to each towing ship to pass lines and assist them to keep bows out against the current.
  - (8) Five MTBs were to make continuous high speed runs in column as close in to the LSTs as possible to back up the water under the sterns of the LSTs on the beach.
  - (9) One DE was assigned to make high speed runs if required just off the line of the piers to further the action outlined in item (8).
  - (10) Operations to start at 0700 so as to have each participant ready to exert maximum effort at 0900. One hour thirty minutes was about all the time then left for the salvage effort. By that time all assisting ships would have to get out or risk drying themselves.

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

D. LANDING CRAFT CONTROL, BEACH ORGANIZATION, AND SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT.

-----

3. (Continued)

- (o) On PETER plus TWO morning operations started on scheduled time. LST 697 was pulled off at 0920 - LST 626 at 0929 - LST 171 at 0930. At 0927 LST 613's pelican hook parted. A second hook-up was made and the ship was pulled off shortly after 1000. LST 924 was towed off at 1020. As ships came off efforts were transferred to LSTs 711 and 585 but by that time the water was falling fast. By 1046 it became necessary to get the LCIs out and operations were secured.
- (p) At the time of highest water the LSTs farthest in on the beach reported the following depths of water: Bow 4 feet - midship 5 to 5 feet 10 inches - stern (average) 7 feet. The ships pulled off had 9 feet or less water at the stern. Indications were that suction on them was broken by the flushing operations and they were pulled off the mud much in the same manner as they skidded on to it.
- (q) A total of 12 LSTs out of 20 were unloaded by PETER plus TWO morning. Five of these were retracted as described above. Unloading the remaining LSTs was started PETER plus TWO morning out in the stream using LCMs, and subsequently LCTs, some of which were unloaded on the beach during the night.
- (r) It was planned to lengthen the causeways, freed by the five LSTs, out to a point where ships might ease in to them, unload and retract without danger of getting stuck. This was done. It was also planned to renew the salvage effort on PETER plus THREE morning tide, at least on LSTs 711 and 585 which offered the best possibilities for success. Results cannot be predicted because of the neap tides and it is possible that all seven grounded LSTs may have to await the return of spring tides.
- (s) At 1700 PETER plus TWO Day CTG 78.1 sailed in ROCKY MOUNT (AGC 3) and CTU 78.1.16 became SOPA.

E. FIGHTER DIRECTION.

1. Organization.

- (a) Force Fighter Direction for the TARAkan ISLAND operation was in the USS ROCKY MOUNT (AGC 3) from Sortie of TG 78.1 from MOROTAI 28 April until departure from objective area on 3 May. At this time Fighter Control was passed to the USS BAILEY (DD 492),



CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

E. FIGHTER DIRECTION.

-----

1. (a) (Continued)

pending the establishment of RAAF Mobile Fighter Control Unit ashore. During the pre-landing period from 28 April until PETER Day, 1 May, control was aboard the USS BOISE (CL 47), with the USS TAYLOR (DD 468) as standby. Throughout the approach and landing phase control was passed satisfactorily to the standby FD destroyers USS BAILEY (DD 492), USS BANCROFT (DD 598), and USS PHILIP (DD 498). Briefing preliminary to the operation again proved its worth in that control was passed smoothly and expeditiously.

2. Narrative.

- (a) CTG 78.1 sortied from MOROTAI PETER minus FOUR, 28 April, "Druggist Base" aboard the Flagship, USS ROCKY MOUNT, controlling. A four plane CAP was provided from 0730-1730 and two night fighters on station from 0600-0730 and 1730-1930. The several bogies investigated during the four day approach turned out to be friendly. In the objective area four fighters provided cover throughout the day with dawn and dusk cover again provided by 2 P-61 night fighters. As a precaution against low attacks visual control of part of the CAP was maintained in the late afternoon. No enemy air activity was experienced.

F. COMMUNICATIONS.

1. In preparation for the TARAKAN ISLAND Operation emphasis was placed on getting acquainted with the Australian Signal personnel both officer and enlisted. This was accomplished by frequent conferences at both of the headquarters and visits to the communication centers of both services. A voice circuit was established between the NINTH Australian Division Headquarters and the USS ROCKY MOUNT with a detail of our operators standing watch with the Australians until the idiosyncrasies of both services were mutually understood. Relays of U. S. Navy men were sent to live with the Australian Signalmen, which accomplished the double purpose of getting acquainted and furnished our men with a greatly appreciated holiday and change of routine. The officers met socially to the maximum extent practicable with the club and mess facilities of the staging area. The naval and combined communications functioned according to plan and were mutually satisfactory except for the following features of Air Support Communications:
- (a) Three days before sailing time of the convoy from MOROTAI, at the suggestion of the NINTH Australian Division, and in anticipation of delay in unloading the mobile equipment of the RAAF Air Support

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSF. COMMUNICATIONS.  
-----

## 1. (a) (Continued)

Parties, it was agreed between RAAF and CSA, with the consent of CTG 78.1, to use a portable set for the Air Support Parties (the Australian Army's 108, with a range of approximately 8 miles, and a frequency band from 2500 to 3500 kcs.) during the interim required to obtain and set in operation their mobile equipment. This necessitated a temporary Support Air Request frequency of 3450 kcs. Neither the set nor the frequency were satisfactory due to CW feed-over from other nets aboard the USS ROCKY MOUNT, nor was it properly used since the Parties did not check into the net until 1030 of PETER Day, over two hours after HOW Hour (0815). The RAAF mobile equipment was not ashore and usable on the primary frequency of 4760 kcs. until 1130 of PETER plus ONE Day, resulting in delays in the passing of information from the beach, with resultant difficulties of Air Support Operation.

- (b) In the VHF channels, the Support Air Direction frequency (142.74 mcs) completely cut out reception on the Fighter Director net (142.02 mcs). Some indication of this has appeared before, but not so noticeably. The cause of this trouble is being investigated.
- (c) A few minor errors of radio discipline were noted on the part of net control officers. In at least one instance a frequency was sent plain language over the air by an Australian officer inexperienced in net control. Variations from the Combined British-American R/T Procedure were frequent, denoting the need for thorough instruction of officers.
- (d) All other nets of Air Support performed in a reasonably satisfactory manner, save for some slight feed-over, which was insufficient to prevent good operation on all nets.

G. LOGISTICS.1. Logistics at Staging Areas.

- (a) Logistics support for the TARAKAN Operation was available at LEYTE, MANUS and MOROTAI. Since the Section Base facilities at MOROTAI were known to be limited, all ships of Task Group 78.1 departing from LEYTE and MANUS were directed to use to the utmost the facilities at those bases. As a result, the ships were fairly well supplied when they reached MOROTAI. Here they were enabled to top off completely for the operation, partly because the facilities at the Section Base were compactly laid out, and partly because the



SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSG. LOGISTICS.  
-----

## 1. (a) (Continued)

Service Force Unit, under ComSeronNINE, was very active and cooperative. The provision of recreational facilities for both officers and men by ComNavSectBase, MOROTAI, was beneficial to morale.

- (b) The Group Flagship, USS ROCKY MOUNT (AGC 3), fueled at SUBIC BAY, and took aboard fresh provisions both at SUBIC BAY and at LEYTE. Representatives of the Logistics Section flew from LEYTE to MOROTAI on 3 April to make advance arrangements for the ships of the Task Group which were scheduled to assemble at MOROTAI. On 6 April they flew to MANUS to ensure the forwarding of supplies unobtainable in forward areas. These included medical supplies, GSK, ships stores' stock, radio and radar parts, boat spares, and clothing. Much of this material was consigned to CNSB, MOROTAI. In addition, 50 tons of trans-shipment freight for ships of Task Group 78.1 were located and forwarded on LST 743. The Officer in Charge, Pontoon Assembly Depot No. 1, was interviewed to ensure that adequate bull-dozers, chains, anchors, hawsers, and causeway materials were available, in addition to the prescribed complement of personnel properly equipped for subsistence on the beach.

- (c) When the ships arrived at MOROTAI they were able to take advantage of the following facilities:

U.S.S. BLOUNT (AK 163)	-	GSK, Ships' Stores, Clothing and Small Stores, Provisions.
S.S. DAVID J. BREWER	-	A balanced supply of ammunition.
YF 619	-	Diesel Spares.
U.S.S. BANSHEE (IX 178)	-	Black Oil and Lubes.
U.S.S. MINX (IX 123)	-	Diesel Oil, smoke munitions.
U.S.S. CULEBRA ISLAND (ARG 7)		
U.S.S. ACHILLES (ARL 4)		
ELO #14	-	Small boat repairs ashore.

- (d) Water was available at the rate of 240,000 gallons per day at Navy Dock and at Army Dock #2. Fresh and dry provisions, beer, cigarettes, clothing, small stores, lube oils, and GSK were issued at the Section Base. Two T6 pontoon cells fitted with manhole and

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

G. LOGISTICS.

-----

1. (d) (Continued)

watertight cover were loaded aboard the ROCKY MOUNT to serve as water tanks for the troops at the objective.

- (e) The material condition of the ships was remarkably good, in view of the fact that many of them had been operating continuously without their scheduled overhaul. PC 1122 was sent to HOLLANDIA for repairs to main and auxiliary mufflers, boiler coils, oil tank, and cooling pump. LST 171 replaced port clutch tire; LST 613 installed engine block, LST 585 made repairs to starboard engine; TITANIA and ROCKY MOUNT cleaned boilers, and other ships accomplished similar routine repair and cleaning. No serious breakdowns occurred en route to the objective.

2. Logistics at the Objective.

- (a) LST 67 was designated to serve as logistics ship at the objective, and was equipped to dispense diesel fuel, fresh water, dry provisions, and a balanced assortment of ammunition which had been loaded at MOROTAI. She did a splendid job loading and distributing this material.
- (b) USS WINOOSKI (AO 38) was brought forward to the objective from TAWITAWI and furnished black oil and diesel to escort and support craft.
- (c) Except for battle damages, which are described elsewhere in this report, the material condition of the ships remained relatively good. YMS 51 reported leaks in stern tubes. YMS 363 needed overhaul of sweep generator. HMAS LACHLAN (K 364) reported being overdue for boiler cleaning. YMS 68 needed new hammer for acoustic sweep. HMAS BURDEKIN reported boiler defects necessitating a refitting. Such LCIs as received underwater damage during salvage operations were repaired at the objective except for LCIs 1008 and 655, for which drydocking was requested upon return to MOROTAI.
- (d) In general, the logistics situation for the operation was very favorable, mainly because of the forethought and energy of the various unit commanders in utilizing the Service Force facilities present.



SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

H. MEDICAL

1. Preparation for the Operation.

- (a) The principal activity in preparation for the TARAKAN Operation consisted of the following:
  - (1) Obtaining three medical officers and 20 hospital corpsmen, on a temporary duty basis, to reinforce personnel regularly attached to the ships.
  - (2) Obtaining bulk medical supplies for processing and re-issue to ships needing them.
  - (3) Organizing a mobile surgical team consisting of two medical officers and eight hospital corpsmen who were drilled in team work.
  - (4) Organizing a surgical exchange to process bulk supplies and to prepare sterile surgical packages of gauze, towels, sheets, etc., for issue to ships which had no adequate sterilizing facilities.
  - (5) Assigning one medical officer and four hospital corpsmen to the MANOORA and to the WESTRALIA, two corpsmen to the Beach Party, and one corpsman each to the ROCKY MOUNT and LST 613.
  - (6) Holding conferences with the Australian Staff Medical Officers. These were followed by a joint meeting of Army-Navy medical officers on 20 April 1945. All officers concerned had previously received copies of the Medical Plan. This procedure is customary with this command and has proved to be a valuable means of achieving understanding of the Plan and full cooperation between the Navy and the Landing Force.

2. Activities En Route

- (a) On the second day out of MOROTAI, a case of progressive infection of the upper lip was transferred from the LST 1027, which had no medical officer embarked, to the USS CALDWELL.
- (b) The same night a gangrenous appendix was removed on board the HMAS BARCOO from a patient who had been transferred at sea from the HMAS HAWKESBURY.

3. Activities at the Objective.

- (a) An ambulance boat was kept standing by at the flagship, ready to be dispatched at a moment's notice.

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

H. MEDICAL

-----

3. (Continued)

- (b) The Group Surgeon was at the Line of Departure during the early stages of the landing and at 0845 he landed on the beach, where the following action was taken:
  - (1) After a survey of the beaches, a Navy evacuation center was designated on GREEN Beach TWO.
  - (2) Two hospital corpsmen were ordered to GREEN Beach ONE to take care of civilian casualties until the Australian medical detachment arrived.
  - (3) Blood was transferred from the Naval blood bank to the Australian Beach Group.
  - (4) The first three casualties were evacuated at 0945 (I). One man with an abdominal wound was off the beach 35 minutes after the injury was sustained.
- (c) The ships designated to handle casualties were inspected.
  - (1) The MANOORA was observed to have an efficient system of receiving casualties.
  - (2) The WESTRALIA handled the abdominal case well and quickly.
  - (3) The rest of the ships were not employed for casualties until later.
- (d) In the late afternoon evacuation by boat had to be abandoned. No surgically equipped LST could be beached. In anticipation of this possibility, the Mobile Surgical Team had been organized. It was established on board the LST 1027 and functioned aboard that ship for 24 hours. The team performed 20 operations on 23 patients, of whom 15 were seriously wounded and suffering from shock.
- (e) PETER plus ONE Day was quiet and only routine activities occurred until 1530 (I), when YMS 481 was sunk and YMS 334 and YMS 364 were damaged by enemy action. Six casualties were placed in the ROCKY MOUNT, four in the PHOENIX, and four in LST 171. Unhurt survivors were also sent to the PHOENIX and ROCKY MOUNT.
- (f) On PETER plus TWO Day all blood not actually needed by the ships was transferred to the Army. LSTs 171 and 613 were ready to sail.



CONFIDENTIALPART VSPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSH. MEDICAL  
-----

## 3. (Continued)

- (g) The following table shows the number of casualties present aboard the ships on PETER plus TWO Day at 1000 (I).

SHIP	AMERICAN				ALLIED				GRAND TOTAL
	Litter		Ambulatory		Litter		Ambulatory		
	Army	Navy	Army	Navy	Army	Navy	Army	Navy	
ROCKY MOUNT		10		2	5				17
MANOORA					8				8
WESTRALIA					6		3		9
PHOENIX		3							3
LST 171					16		8		24
LST 613					9		5		14
LST 1027		2			18		3		23
TOTAL		15		2	62		19		98

I. INTELLIGENCE1. Planning.

- (a) Preparation of a preliminary study of the TARAKAN objective area was commenced about 24 March 1945.
- (b) Photographic coverage of the objective area was requested from the Far Eastern Air Forces on 26 March 1945, and most of this was received in time for interpretation and the preparation of mosaics. Low altitude high-angle obliques of satisfactory quality and coverage, however, were not received until 20 April, too late for the preparation and lithographing of a panoramic mosaic for inclusion in the attack order. This mosaic was subsequently prepared and distributed separately.
- (c) During the staging period facilities for photographic and map reproduction were used to capacity in fulfilling the requirements of TG 78.1, I Australian Corps, the 26th Australian Brigade, and units attached. 4,386 photographic prints of 8" x 10" size were made in

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. INTELLIGENCE

-----

1. (c) (Continued)

the photographic laboratory, and a total of 40,880 impressions printed.

2. Objective Area.

- (a) Two photographers were assigned to cover the various phases of the pre-PETER Day activities and subsequent operations. One was assigned to cover the SADAU ISLAND landing on PETER minus ONE Day; one assigned to cover the demolition of underwater beach obstacles. Two other photographers were assigned to various stations on the flagship to cover activities pertinent to the operation. A part of the coverage by these photographers is submitted in the photographic portion of this report.
- (b) Plots concerning all of the TARAKAN operation activities were maintained in the Intelligence Office and Flag Plot.
- (c) Personnel rosters and other documents received from a Chinese and a native of CELEBES residing on BOENJOE ISLAND were forwarded to the Allied translator and interpreter section ashore.
- (d) On PETER plus ONE Day inspection of the defenses in the landing beach area was made in order to check on the accuracy of the defenses reported by photo interpretation. The actual defenses on the beaches proved to be nearly as those described in the annotated mosaics. appended to the intelligence annex.
- (e) Although coastal batteries had been suspected to be present on CAPE DJOEATA, their presence was not revealed until PETER plus ONE Day, 2 May 1945, when these well-concealed batteries opened accurate and destructive gunfire on three of our minesweepers.

J. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Air Support.

(a) Comment.

- (1) The 13th AAF planes that reported on station for the pre-landing strikes on PETER Day experienced some difficulty in contacting the CSA on the primary Support Air Direction frequency.



CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

J. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

-----

1. (Continued)

(b) Recommendation.

- (1) That all strike planes but particularly the special strike groups reporting to the CSA be up on both Support Air Direction frequencies, primary and secondary, in the event that difficulty is encountered on the primary an immediate call up should be made on the secondary frequency.

(c) Comment.

- (1) Special strike groups on PETER Day arrived on station without allowing sufficient time to correct for any minor communication difficulties.

(d) Recommendation.

- (1) That all special strike groups be dispatched to arrive on station at least 15 minutes before the time scheduled for the strike.

2. Communications.

(a) Recommendations.

- (1) That all Air Support Parties be equipped with a good portable radio, such as U. S. Army's SCR 284, which can be carried ashore and set up immediately upon landing, in any event not later than HOW Hour plus 60, to provide necessary and immediate information for CSA, the Naval Task Force Commander and the Landing Force Commander.
- (2) That all Air Support personnel of the landing force be thoroughly briefed, in accordance with lessons learned in this landing, on all points of communications between them and the CSA.
- (3) That VHF channel 1 (Army channel D - 140.58 mcs.) hereafter be assigned for Support Air Direction, in accordance with CentCom II, as being least likely to interfere with other VHF channels.

3. Intelligence.

(a) Photographs.

(1) Comment.

During the early planning stage, before the photographs ordered

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

SPECIAL COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

J. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

-----

3. (a) (1) (Continued)

by Commander Amphibious Group SIX had been received, there was inadequate photographic coverage available for study and planning.

(2) Recommendation.

Photographic coverage in general as described below should be ordered and be made available for use of task force and task group commanders at the time of their designation. This command has found the most practicable requirements as follows: Vertical color photographs, scale 1 to 5,000, 50 percent water and 50 percent land. Verticals (black and white), scale 1 to 5,000, 60 percent overlap, 20 to 30 percent lateral lap. Obliques (black and white) low altitude, high-angle, 20 percent overlap at the shoreline.

(b) Charts.

(1) Comment.

A 1 to 25,000 chart of TARAKAN produced by the 2/1 Australian Army Topographical Survey Company was selected as the most desirable for bombardment purposes. It bore numbered 1000 meter grid squares with lettered divisions of 200 meters each. A 1 to 50,000 chart produced by the same organization had the same grid with a 150 meter variance in position. The U. S. Hydrographic Office miscellaneous charts 11,609-101 to 11,609-106 of 1 to 36,000 scale with the same grid had a variance of approximately 300 meters. Due to these variations no bombardment charts other than the 1 to 25,000 one were distributed.

(2) Recommendation.

Although gridded charts furnished were of great assistance in conducting the operation, it is suggested that units producing charts for a given operation take measures to insure a uniformity in the location of grids on charts of different scales.

PART VI

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

1. All personnel performed assigned duties in a highly satisfactory manner. The personnel of the minesweeping unit are due special commendation for their outstanding work in clearing assigned areas of mines present and for their cool



CONFIDENTIAL

PART VI

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

-----

1. (Continued)

conduct under fire when engaged by an enemy coastal battery while conducting minesweeping operations north of CAPE DJOEATA on PETER plus ONE Day.

2. Also noteworthy of special mention were the ship's companies of the USS COFER (APD 62), LCSS 8 and 28 and LCI 1008 which proceeded close inshore to silence the enemy battery which had sunk YMS 481, and the crews of the LCIs and PTs which aided materially in retracting the LSTs on PETER plus TWO Day.
3. The efficiency of boat control and boat wave guide personnel was displayed in the split-second dispatching of all waves and the excellent timing of the amphibious landing. U. S. Army boat crews of the 593rd Engineer Shore and Boat Regiment gave an excellent performance, as did the personnel of the 727th Amphibious Tractor Battalion.
4. Coordination and cooperation with the Australian Forces and attached units was excellent.
5. Commendations of individuals will be forwarded separately.

PART VII

PICTORIAL SECTION

- A. The following pages contain a pictorial representation of various phases of the Operation.

PART VII - PICTORIAL SECTION



1. Australian troops go ashore at SADAU ISLAND on P-1 Day to set up artillery in support of TARAKAN ISLAND landings.



2. Raising the Australian Flag on SADAU ISLAND, near TARAKAN HARBOR P-1 Day.






3. Setting up artillery on SADAU ISLAND, P-1 Day.



4. Engineers attach demolition charges to beach obstacles under cover of smoke on P-1 Day.




5. Plane laying smoke to cover breaching of obstacles, P-1 Day (30 April 1945).




6. Photograph at low tide shows demolition of steel rail beach obstacles by demolition charges.






7. Oil storage tanks and beach area burning after bombardment during P-1 Day operations.



8. Naval bombardment hits fuel storage and ammunition dump (on right) in pre-invasion shelling. P-Day, 1 May 1945.



9. White flare (upper left) signals to lift Naval gunfire from beach as "H" Hour approaches.



10. LSTs beached in gaps blown in obstacles and commence unloading operations as tide rapidly recedes. Anti-tank ditch in foreground holds up unloading. P-Day.






11. Unloading continues as LSTs are left resting on the mud by receding tide. Note heavy canvas-backed steel matting used to facilitate unloading through deep mud. P-Day.



12. LINGKAS Pier area is rapidly occupied by Australian troops. P-Day.




13. Engineers commence repairs on South Pier damaged by enemy. P/1 Day.



14. Supplies and ammunition stacked on South Pier awaiting repairs to pier. P/1 Day.







15. Reinforced concrete pillbox near beachhead.



16. Details of anti-tank ditch with built-in pillbox (left) fronting beach. LST 584 may be seen high and dry.



17. Pillbox built into anti-tank ditch covers beach area.



18. LCIs help LST to retract from beach at high tide. PT boats in background create waves to assist in operation. P+2 Day.



File No. FE25/ A16-3  
Serial No. FF-3138

SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE  
Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

CONFIDENTIAL

JUN 20 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:  
CTG 78.1 conf. ltr.,  
serial 0188 of 5 May  
1945.

From: Commander Task Force SEVENTY-EIGHT.  
(Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force)  
To: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.  
Via: Commander SEVENTH Fleet.  
Subject: Action Report, CTG 78.1 (ComPhibGrp SIX) -  
TARAKAN, BORNEO, Operation (1-3 May 1945).

1. Forwarded.
2. This was a combined operation which presented many unique and difficult problems. Such problems were all solved in a highly satisfactory manner. The complete success of the operation is evidence of the excellent team work and cooperation displayed by those involved. It is a high tribute to the ability and good judgement of the Australian and United States Officers who planned and executed the operation.
3. The performance of the SADAU Attack Unit (78.1.16) which took its objective on PETER minus ONE Day and supported the operations of breaching beach obstacles was especially note worthy. Likewise the performance of the Royal Australian Engineers who on PETER minus ONE Day successfully breached the beach obstacles on the beaches selected for the main PETER Day landings was commendable.
4. The performance of the minesweeping unit was uniformly excellent and materially contributed to the success of the operation.
5. From information not fully furnished in the attached report it is known that the problem of navigating the Attack Group in approaching the objective area on the morning of 1 May 1945 was a difficult one, due to: (1) possible presence of mines in certain areas which required change of entrance plan, (2) rain squalls, (3) number of ships in formation, (4) narrow approach lane. The way in which this problem was handled permitted the safe arrival of all units on schedule and is commendable.

③

Copy to:  
CTG 78.1 (ComPhibGrp 6)

*D. E. Barbey*  
D. E. BARBEY

7 04211

71

UNITED STATES FLEET  
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

Al6-3(F-3-4/bc)

Serial 04877

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on:  
ComPhibGrp 6 Conf. ltr.  
serial 0188 of 5 May 1945.

12 III 1945  
REG. NO F340  
R. S. NO 7 04211  
REG. SHEET NO 210

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.  
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.  
Subject: Action Report, CTG 78.1 (ComPhibGrp SIX) -  
TARAKAN, BORNEO, Operation (1-3 May 1945).  
Reference: (c) CominCh Restr. airmailgram 192047 (Jan-  
uary 1945).

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks contained  
in the first endorsement.

2. The splendid cooperation between the officers  
of the Australian and United States' forces is a source of great  
satisfaction to this command.

3. This operation was efficiently and skillfully  
conducted by Commander Task Group 78.1.

4. By copy of this endorsement, Commander Seventh  
Amphibious Force is directed to insure that the comment con-  
tained in paragraph 3 of this endorsement is made a part of  
the record of Commander Task Group 78.1 (Commander Amphibious  
Group SIX), as required by reference (c).

*Forest B. Royal*

*F. C. Kinkaid*

F. C. KINKAID

Copy to:  
Com7thPhibFor  
ComPhibGrp 6

(2)

72